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Abstract
As location-enabled technologies are becoming ubiquitous, our loca-
tion is being shared with an ever-growing number of external services.
Issues revolving around location privacy – or geoprivacy – therefore con-
cern the vast majority of the population, largely without knowing how
the underlying technologies work and what can be inferred from an indi-
vidual’s location, especially if recorded over longer periods of time. Re-
search, on the other hand, has largely treated this topic from isolated
standpoints, most prominently from the technological and ethical point
of view. This article therefore reflects upon the current state of geoprivacy
from a broader perspective. It integrates technological, ethical, legal, and
educational aspects and clarifies how they interact and shape how we deal
with the corresponding technology, both individually and as a society. It
does so in the form of a manifesto, consisting of 21 theses that summarise
the main arguments made in the article. These theses argue that location
information is di↵erent from other kinds of personal information and, in
combination, show why geoprivacy (and privacy in general) needs to be
protected and should not become a mere illusion. The fictional couple of
Jane and Tom is used as a running example to illustrate how common it
has become to share our location information, and how it can be used –
both for good and for worse.
1 Introduction
After Jane wakes up to the chime of her smartphone’s alarm, she brings up the
weather app to check how to dress for the day. While she skims her inbox, her
phone brings up an alert, telling her that her commute might take a little longer
today because of construction work on her subway line. She quickly gets ready
and leaves the house to make sure she will not be late for work and swipes her
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monthly pass to enter the subway station. Since the construction work only
caused a few minutes delay in her commute, she still has time to stop at her
favorite co↵ee shop, using her credit card to pay for a cappuccino. When she
enters the o ce building she works in, her phone brings up the reminder she
had set the day before to make sure she downloads the client presentation she
had been working on last night from her cloud storage to her o ce computer.
Jane’s husband Tom left the house early this morning for a two-day meeting
out of town. He did not really mind the two hour drive, since this was his first
opportunity for an extended trip in his brand new car. When he purchased
it the week before, he had signed up for the roadside assistance plan after his
old station wagon had left him stranded several times. Following the GPS
instructions, he takes the toll bridge to get out of town and onto the highway.
Before he arrives at the meeting, he decides to find a place for breakfast, checking
for on-line ratings and recommendations first. Later that day, Tom goes out to
have dinner with his colleagues, checking in at the restaurant with his favorite
social network to let his friends know about their fantastic selection of red wines.
After paying with his company credit card, he uses the limousine app on his
phone to find a nearby driver to take him back to the hotel.
In these two short, yet very common examples, Jane and Tom have shared
their location with a dozen parties: the weather app provider, the operator
of the digital assistant, the subway operator, two credit card companies, the
reminder app, the cloud storage provider, the roadside assistance provider, the
toll station operator, the restaurant ratings service, the social network, and
the limousine app service. While some of these services may be o↵ered by the
same provider – such as the operating system provider running the weather
service and the digital assistant – this demonstrates how we share our location
information with a large number of entities on a daily basis, together with
other personal identifiable information (PII) such as credit card numbers, user
names, license plates, or customer numbers. Such location information does not
always come as readily mappable pairs of geographic coordinates, but rather as
the ID of a subway turnstile, a toll gate, or the name of a restaurant. However,
such qualitative location information can still easily be georeferenced (Vasardani
et al., 2013, for example), and in combination provide a detailed picture of an
identifiable individual’s whereabouts.
While these samples of their location history are always triggered by a spe-
cific action such as a credit card payment or the swipe of a subway pass, cell
phones act as permanent (coarse) positioning devices through the cellular tow-
ers they are connected to. With the vast majority of adults in the world –
including many developing countries – carrying cell phones today (World Bank,
2016), network providers have a continuous record of their users’ locations that
goes far beyond the samples in our introductory example (Ahas et al., 2015).
Moreover, having these records for a large number of users and long periods of
time bears the potential for analyses at the social network level (Eagle et al.,
2009), especially if linked to the users’ communication through phone calls and
text messages. Likewise, operators of WiFi hotspots can keep track of devices
that pass by frequently, even if they do not connect to the hotspot (Miller,
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2013).
Whether location information comes as point samples or as a continuous
track stored by a mobile phone operator (Zeit Online, 2011; Sascha Venohr,
2012), Jane and Tom do not know, or have no control of, what happens to their
location information. This holds even if they did read the terms of service for
the applications they have been using and the provider contracts they signed.
They most often do not know if the location will be stored and for how long,
and whether the information will be shared with other parties, or whether it
may at some point be accessed illegally by malicious hackers. Even if said terms
of service contain information about the storage times, there is no way for users
to check whether service providers stick to the promised time limits, let alone
enforcing them. They do not know at what resolution the location is stored, and
whether the recorded location has been correct in the first place. Morerover –
and maybe most importantly – they may not even be aware that their location
information is being recorded at all.
The goal of this article is to reflect upon the current state of individual lo-
cation privacy – or geoprivacy – and attempt to set the research agenda in this
area for the coming years. While it does give a coarse overview of the current
state of the art in this field, its primary goal is not to serve as a review ar-
ticle; Beresford and Stajano (2003), Duckham and Kulik (2006), and Krumm
(2009) already provide excellent and more comprehensive reviews. Wegener and
Masser (1996) have outlined four di↵erent scenarios concerning the development
of geoprivacy in the mid-1990s, and, 20 years later, came to the conclusion that
these scenarios cannot be viewed in isolation. Moreover, they “underestimated
the huge privacy problems connected with these technologies” (Masser and We-
gener, 2016, p. 1158). The main argument put forward here is therefore that
the community has been approaching geoprivacy independently either only from
a technological standpoint, or only from an ethical standpoint so far. We argue
that those technological and ethical perspectives need to be combined and inte-
grated with educational and legal aspects of this problem space to address the
fact that geoprivacy concerns almost every individual in the developed world,
and increasingly also in developing countries.
Summarizing these observations in a manifesto as a series of theses seems to
be an appropriate format for this purpose, which clearly states and reflects on
the current state of the art, points out goals, and formulates challenges. One
does not have to go back to Luther or Marx and Engels for examples – famous
examples that are closer to the topic of this article include the näıve physics
manifesto (Hayes et al., 1978), which has been transferred to our domain as
näıve geography (Egenhofer and Mark, 1995); the manifesto for agile software
development (Beck et al., 2001); the manifesto of transdisciplinarity (Nicolescu,
2002); the object-oriented database system manifesto (Atkinson et al., 1989);
and the cluetrain manifesto (Levine, 2000). As in all of these examples, the the-
ses put forward in the geoprivacy manifesto will necessarily reflect the authors’
personal views to a certain extent; however, this is intentional, since one of the
reasons for a manifesto is to trigger a discussion in the community.
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2 Yet again, spatial is special
Geoprivacy1 has been defined “as a special type of information privacy which
concerns the claim of individuals to determine for themselves when, how, and
to what extent location information about them is communicated to others. In
short, control of location information is the central issue in location privacy”
(Duckham and Kulik, 2006, p. 36). “It refers to the ability of an individual to
move in public spaces with a reasonable expectation that their location will not
be systematically and secretly recorded for later use by a third party” (Kerski
and Clark, 2012, as cited in Kerski 2016). One might argue that geoprivacy is
just a special case of general information privacy. Both have recently declined,
as more and more PII is being collected, stored and shared between di↵erent
governmental and private actors. Examples include credit ratings, purchasing
behavior, and health records (including the increasing use of fitness apps, wear-
ables and the quantified self movement) (Libert, 2015; Lupton, 2016), to name
but a few. As in many other cases though (Anselin, 1989; Egenhofer, 1993;
Gould et al., 1996; Hart and Dolbear, 2009), spatial is special for the sharing
(and collection) of PII for the reasons discussed in the remainder of this section.
Thesis 1 Information about an individuals’ location is substantially di↵erent
from other kinds of personally identifiable information.
2.1 Access to location information
The insight that geographic information has gone mainstream and is now being
used and produced by a much bigger audience than just GIS professionals is
by no means new. Dunn (2007, p. 618) already commented on this in 2007,
even before smartphones with embedded GPS chips were available.2 The ini-
tial spark for this development was the discontinuation of selective availability
for the Global Positioning System (GPS) in May 2000,3 which accelerated the
development of ever smaller and cheaper receiver units. GPS receivers are now
embedded in the main chips for most mobile devices. While there seem to
be no reliable numbers on the total number of GPS enabled smartphones, the
2015 median for adults who report owning a smartphone was 68% for advanced
economies, and 54% for emerging/developing economies (Pew Research Center,
2014). Taking wearable devices such as sports watches and fitness trackers into
account, it is safe to assume that billions of devices worldwide can now be posi-
tioned via GPS, most of which are more or less permanently with their owners.
Other positioning techniques based on WiFi or Bluetooth (Zandbergen, 2009)
can be used to augment or even replace GPS-based positioning, making the
trackable population even larger.
1
This article uses the terms geoprivacy and location privacy synonymously, as does the
literature in this field.
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In fact, the first iPhone was presented the same year (which only got built-in GPS with
the 3G model in 2008), and the first version of Google Maps was introduced only two years
before.
3
See http://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/modernization/sa/.
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In order to make it easy for app developers to access the location information
gathered by these hardware sensors, application programming interfaces (APIs)
have been added to all major mobile operating systems.4 For web apps based on
HTML and JavaScript, the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) has developed
a standardized location API as part of the HTML5 e↵ort. It has been imple-
mented in all major mobile web browsers. Many browsers running on desktop
operating systems also o↵er location-based services through this API, albeit at a
coarser resolution, since the location is usually an estimate based on IP address.
The developments both on hardware and software levels outlined above have
made a user’s location extremely easy to capture, often with only a few lines of
code, and the required hardware sensors are built into even relatively low-end
devices. Therefore, location data is much easier to obtain than other kinds of
data about users.
Thesis 2 Ubiquitous positioning devices and easy-to use APIs make informa-
tion about an individuals’ location much easier to capture than other
kinds personally identifiable information.
In the many cases where the user’s location is also displayed on a map, this
often happens using one of a handful of web mapping APIs that allow developers
to embed maps in websites as well as desktop and mobile applications. The
companies o↵ering those APIs can thus collect location data from individual
users across services and devices as a third party (see Section 6), giving them
a much broader insight into a users’ location history than any of the individual
applications can get.
2.2 Utility of location information
On top of the technical ease of sharing and collecting location information, users
have a high incentive to share their whereabouts with information services. In
other areas such as finance, market research, or health, it is often not in the
interest of the user to share any of their information. It is in the interest of a
bank, online shop, or health insurance company to know as much as possible
about their (potential) customers, but sharing their information hardly ever
improves the services significantly for the users (despite online advertising firms’
claims that tracking users allows them to show more relevant advertising, for
example). On the contrary, users can be denied a mortgage (or granted only at
high interest rates), or insurance companies can turn down applications based
on the applicant’s financial or health profile.
Sharing a user’s location, however, often does improve a service significantly.
When Jane is searching the web for a pediatrician or evening classes to learn
a new language, getting results independent of her location is quite useless, as
4
See https://developers.google.com/android/reference/com/google/android/
gms/location/package-summary and https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/
documentation/UserExperience/Conceptual/LocationAwarenessPG/CoreLocation/
CoreLocation.html.
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she won’t take her child to a pediatrician across the country, and she won’t
attend Danish classes every Thursday night in Chicago if she lives in Seattle.
As a result, users either add at least their current city to the query (Rose and
Levinson, 2004), or they allow the search engine to use their current location
directly through the APIs discussed in Section 2.1. Admittedly, the information
that the pediatrician with the best online ratings is across town, but the third
best is just around the corner would have been available without sharing the
user’s location in principle. However, automatically getting results that have
been adapted to their current location is a significant improvement: it saves
a number of clicks and visiting websites that are not relevant, and therefore,
time. While convenience seems to be the main factor for such services, others
do not work at all without knowing the user’s current (and/or future) location.
Examples for such services include directions to get from A to B using di↵erent
modes of transportation, check-ins in social networks, finding nearby friends, or
location-based notifications (Fechner et al., 2016) or reminders such as “remind
me to drop o↵ that letter next time I’m near a post o ce”.
Thesis 3 Users of information services have a substantial incentive to share
their location with service providers, as location information can sig-
nificantly improve the quality of a service and make it more useful.
All of this is not to say that users always share their location knowingly
and willingly. Numerous examples have been documented where mobile apps
track their users’ locations, while the apps have clearly no requirement to know
where the user is. Examples of such coerced geographic information (McKenzie
and Janowicz, 2014) include flashlight apps and games without any functional
requirement to know their users’ locations (Hong, 2012), thus violating their
geoprivacy to learn as much as possible about them. A recent study has also
unveiled a new type of coerced geographic information, using ultrasound signals
for location tracking (Arp et al., 2017). These signals, inaudible for the human
ear, are emitted by speakers placed in stores and picked up by an app through a
smartphone’s microphone. The corresponding apps use one of the APIs devel-
oped by several companies in this business. This type of information provides
the participating stores with information about frequent customers and the API
provider with detailed personal-level location profiles. These get more detailed
as the number of participating stores increases. It is safe to assume that the
vast majority of users are not aware that they are being tracked this way.
Thesis 4 Users often share their current location unknowingly.
2.3 Location-based inferences
A user’s location as such, even over longer periods of time, is only part of the
story. Location information is also substantially di↵erent from other kinds of
PII from a service providers perspective, as it allows for inferences about many
other kinds of information about its users. Knowing where Tom goes shopping
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for groceries, what restaurants he prefers, and what kind of co↵ee shops he fre-
quents can accumulate to detailed consumer profiles over time, even without
knowing what he purchased. Knowing home and work locations alone can al-
ready put Tom in a narrow socio-economic bracket, with commuting patterns
and information about frequent visits to locations such as schools or hospitals
making that profile even more detailed. Therefore, while a user’s location as
such can be classified as observed PII, it acts as an enabler for inferred PII
(OECD, 2013).
Thesis 5 Having access to a user’s location history allows for a broad range
of location-based inferences, such as information about their health,
consumer behavior, or social status.
Location-based inferences are not always made with the user’s consent, or
even awareness. They can easily reconstruct information about a user that they
never agreed to or intended to share with a service provider. Moreover, the
inferences made are not necessarily correct. While a service provider making
location-based inferences does have an interest in making correct inferences,
these inferences are predictions, which can go wrong. Service providers strive for
a high correlation between those predictions and reality, however, the underlying
algorithms will always fail in some cases, especially if they do not match the
typical profiles: A user may be in perfect health despite never going near a gym
and visiting pubs twice a week, another one may have significant disposable
income every month despite living in a working class neighborhood, to name just
two examples. Such individual cases are not very problematic for the service
providers, as they aim for a high correlation overall. They may have significant
adverse e↵ects for the a↵ected individuals, however, as they lower their consumer
profile rating, making them less attractive customers and potentially driving up
costs for services, loans, or insurance. Moreover, there is little the user can
do about such incorrect inferences, as they are usually unaware of them in the
first place. More transparent solutions that put the individual in control are
therefore required to make the overall solution – which may benefit large groups
of users – more fair.
Thesis 6 Location-based inferences can reveal information that the user never
intended or agreed to share with a service.
In extreme cases, this can extend to individuals who do not even use any
location-based services themselves. The default locations recorded for large ad-
ministrative areas such as countries or states recorded in IP-based geocoding
services, for example, have been shown to cause significant problems for indi-
vuals living close to those locations. They have been accused of di↵erent crimes
based on the geographic location provided for an IP address that the service
could not localize accurately, and hence returned the default location for the
region – which happened to be at or near their home address (Hill, 2016). In
this case, a rather obvious mistake has been made inferring their identity for
the location provided by an IP-based geocoder.
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Thesis 7 Incorrect location-based inferences can have severe adverse e↵ects for
the a↵ected individuals, with little to no opportunity to rectify those
errors.
3 Economic value of location information
This section discusses the market value of location information from a business
as well as a customer or user perspective. It concludes with observations about
an emerging market for location information that connects these two prespec-
tives.
3.1 The business perspective
The success of companies such as Google and Facebook shows that PII clearly
has a significant economic value, as the data such companies collect are core
assets for them. For some companies, e.g., Foursquare, their primary business
model centers around selling their users’ location information (Finley, 2016).
However, assessing the concrete economic value of PII – i.e., putting a num-
ber on it – is not straightforward. Feijóo et al. (2014) have explored di↵er-
ent approaches and conclude that revenue per data record is a useful measure.
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) notes,
however, that this is only an indirect measure, and proposes the consideration
of market prices at which personal data records are o↵ered as a direct measure
(OECD, 2013). In the same report, the costs for a data breach are also discussed
as a measure, following the assumption that a data record is more valuable the
more confidential it is.
While these papers consider location information as part of a data record,
they do not discuss the value of information about an individual’s location as
such. A report fromMcKinsey estimates the “potential annual consumer surplus
from using personal location data globally” at $600 billion (Manyika et al., 2011,
p. VII). While the report acknowledges that the value of an individual’s location
information varies from country to country (and certainly even between much
smaller spatial units), it gives no indication as to how the value of an individual
record could be assessed. In an attempt to address this problem, Baccelli and
Bolot (2011) develop a complex economic model based on potential revenue
from a customer in the vicinity of a business. While the model targets a very
specific use case – which is just one among many existing and potential for
individual-level location information – it does take uncertainty in the location
information into account.
Thesis 8 Knowing a customer’s location is an economic asset for a business.
3.2 The user perspective
Other researchers have looked at the same problem from the user side, inves-
tigating how much money (or other kind of compensation) users would ask for
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sharing their location. Table 1 summarizes the results of the di↵erent stud-
ies, which show that users seem to base their asking price both on the type of
location information they are supposed to share and the use of that information.
Table 1: Prices individuals asked for di↵erent aspects of their location informa-
tion in di↵erent studies. N indicates the number of participants in the respective
study.
N Location type Price asked
Danezis et al. (2005) 74 Constant tracking
for one month
£10 (academic use)
£20 (commercial use)
Cvrcek et al. (2006) 1200 Constant tracking
for one month
AC40–50 (academic use)
AC80–90 (commercial
use)
Krumm (2009) 250 2 weeks of car
GPS tracks
1% chance to win $200
MP3 player
Barak et al. (2013) 25 Work and home
locations
AC8.00 (home)
AC5.40 (work)
Some of those studies used auctions to simulate a market situation with
supply and demand (Danezis et al., 2005; Cvrcek et al., 2006), while others only
asked for the price participants were asking for their information (Barak et al.,
2013; Krumm, 2009). Nonetheless, in combination, this body of research points
to the fact that the situation is not quite as bad as stated by Krumm, who
concluded that “people do not care about location privacy” (Krumm, 2009, p.
392). Users seem to be aware – at least partially – that their location information
is an economic asset, and that it can potentially be used against them. This
insight is supported by the fact that most of the studies cited in this section
also report participants who refused to share their location information, either
altogether or for specific (commercial) use.
Thesis 9 Users value their own location information based on level of detail
and use case.
3.3 An emerging market
The recent trend of o↵ering discounts to customers who share their location in-
formation might provide insights that combine the business perspective and the
user perspective. Users have been sharing their location in exchange for a free
service for years now, including navigation or lookup of points of interest. More
recently, however, businesses have started o↵ering monetary compensation to
customers who agree to share their location with them. Auto insurance com-
panies have started o↵ering pay while you drive plans that require customers
to install an OBD-II adapter with GPS and cellular connection in their vehi-
cles. The incentive for the customers is that they only pay for the time and
distance they actually drive, thus saving money compared to the classic flat-
rate model. For example, Progressive Snapshot customers saved an average of
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$150 on their car insurance in 2015 (Progressive News Release, 2015), so Tom
decided to sign up for this plan with his new car.5 In return, the insurance
company gets to learn not only when and where he goes by car, but also learns
about Tom’s driving style, gas consumption, and other engine parameters that
can be read through the standardized OBD-II interface. Likewise, first health
insurance companies are o↵ering discounts on their premiums or rewards such
as gift cards for customers who reach certain goals measured on their fitness
trackers (Eastwood, 2016).
Thesis 10 A new market is currently emerging in which businesses and users
directly trade personal level location information.
Such business models are still relatively new to the market and only a small
percentage of customers seem to have signed up for such plans. Therefore, it
remains to be seen whether this model will gain more popularity in the future.
If it does become the norm, however, we can expect that customers concerned
about sharing their PII will increasingly incur financial penalties, since they
are forced to stay in the more expensive flat-rate plans if they refuse to share
their information. In terms of the insurance market, such individualized plans
even undermine the solidarity principle of a collective insurance, especially for
customers who rely on their vehicle or cannot reach certain fitness goals because
of their health condition.
Thesis 11 Discounts for customers who agree to share their location with a
business are e↵ectively penalizing customers who refuse to do so,
and may erode the solidarity principle behind collective insurance.
4 Safeguarding geoprivacy
The preservation of geoprivacy is the focus of a substantial body of work which
can generally be divided into approaches that address the privacy-preserving
querying of large, already accumulated datasets, and approaches that address
the sharing and collection of individual-level location information. More recent
research has also attempted to assess or classify the degree of (location) privacy
an individual can expect. We will argue that such measures are unrealistic,
because they only consider datasets in isolation.
4.1 Privacy-preserving data collection and querying
An issue that often plagues both private industry and research communities
is the ability to extract meaning from large, location-identifiable datasets, yet
preserve the privacy and anonymity of individuals or groups within the data.
Significant headway is being made in this arena and a number of methods are
5
The Progressive Insurance Company already o↵ered GPS trackers to customers in a pilot
project as early as 2000, lowering their premiums if they avoided areas with elevated accident
rates (Monmonier, 2003).
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currently in use. K-anonymity (Wang et al., 2014) and di↵erential privacy
(Dwork, 2008; Mir et al., 2013) are two of the more common approaches that
have been adopted in the spatial sciences with the aim of maximizing the value
of a dataset containing location information, while minimizing the chances of
identifying individuals or groups in the data. The act of obfuscating location
information to allow some groups access while restricting others (Duckham and
Kulik, 2005; Seidl et al., 2015) has gained traction as well. Examples include
Yahoo’s Fire Eagle (Kiss, 2008), a third-party location-broking application, and
Apple introducing rotating MAC addresses (Zebra Technologies, 2015) with the
purpose of protecting individuals from identification through the MAC address
of their device.
While the majority of work in privacy-preservation has focused on the geo-
graphic coordinates, it is important to consider the non-spatial information we
share. Other sources of published data such as the time and language used in
social media posts can be used to identify place types and knowing the type
of place, e.g., Mexican Restaurant, that Jane visits, can significantly increase
the ability to identify her spatial location (McKenzie et al., 2016). There is
an increasing trend in people choosing to obfuscate their “traditional” location
information, e.g., geographic coordinates, but not realize that their location can
still be inferred through other information such as their stated interests, so-
cial activities and temporal behavior, sometimes referred to as digital exhaust
(Adams and Janowicz, 2012).
Thesis 12 Preserving geoprivacy involves more than obfuscating geographic co-
ordinates. Location can be inferred from non-explicitly geospatial
information such as interests, activities and socio-demographics.
4.2 Assessing geoprivacy
Privacy is a graded concept, and so is geoprivacy. While there may be occasions
where we want to keep our location completely private, there are often cases
where we would agree to share our location up to a certain precision in order
for a better quality of service. On the dating website where Tom met Jane,
for example, he had listed the city he lived in at the time, but not the exact
address. This allowed him to filter potential matches to the same city.
Figure 1 shows this graded concept as the level of privacy intrusion, depicted
as an abstract graph. Other researchers have already presented attempts at de-
veloping more concrete measures of (location) privacy. Lin et al. (2012) propose
to measure privacy as degrees of user comfort, which are based on the users’ ex-
pectations towards an application’s use of a resource, such as location services.
Their research has been used in the development of http://privacygrade.org,
which rates mobile apps on a scale from A to D based on how they respect their
users’ privacy.6 Research from the same group has later proposed the use of
6
The website is o✏ine at the time of writing of this paper, but can still be retrieved
through the wayback machine at https://web.archive.org/web/20161220030726/http://
www.privacygrade.org/.
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qualitative privacy profiles that describe di↵erent user types such as “Privacy
Conservatives” or “The Unconcerned” (Lin et al., 2014). Ultimately these as-
sessments classify the degree of private information a user is willing to share
with a service, and the quality of service she can expect in return. In general,
there is a consensus that by increasing the privacy of the location information
that one chooses to share, the usability of the data decreases (Ardagna et al.,
2007; Bhumiratana and Bishop, 2009).
Precision of user’s location
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Figure 1: The most useful location-based services depend on knowing the user’s
precise location. The more useful a service is, the more severe the intrusion on
the user’s geoprivacy.
Thesis 13 Any location-based service o↵ered to a user is limited by the amount
of private information a user is willing to share.
Mobile operating system settings, letting the user control how and when her
phone shares her location with an app, are testament to the di culty in generat-
ing an intuitive measure of geoprivacy. Apple’s iOS, for example, currently lets
a user select on a per-app basis whether location services should be disabled en-
tirely, available while she is using the app, or available anytime, including when
the app is not open. While this is clearly an improvement over a simple on/o↵
switch, it does not take the context of each respective app into account, namely
why the app needs to know the user’s location. Moreover, it is not possible to
obfuscate the location information to a certain degree before it is forwarded to
the app.
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Thesis 14 Mobile operating systems lack fine-grained control mechanisms for
location services, thus severely limiting the degree of control users
have over their location information.
While these classification approaches are all based on the assumption that a
user is knowingly sharing her location, a di↵erent strand of research has looked at
geoprivacy from a security point of view. Yang et al. (2015) introduce a measure
based on a how revealing a place category can be based on its uniqueness in
the vicinity. Fechner and Kray (2012) discuss di↵erent human strategies to
re-identify previoulsy anonymized individuals. In an experiment involving a
location-based game, they have shown that such strategies can be extremely
successful. In other words, it is often not very hard to re-identify individuals
with some common sense.
Auxilliary data has also been shown to play a vital role in re-identifying
individuals within datasets that appeared to be perfectly anonymized when
inspected on their own (El Emam et al., 2011). The discussions at and proceed-
ings of two workshops on Geoprivacy organized in 2015 and 2016 outline this
dilemma (Keßler et al., 2014; McKenzie et al., 2015), which renders it virtually
impossible to reliably assess how well an individual’s privacy is protected, given
that it is impossible to know what other information a potential attacker could
obtain to aid de-anonymization. Hartzog and Rubinstein (2017) have recently
argued that it would be better to approach this problem from a standpoint of
risk of de-anonymization, comparing it to the field of IT security. The case for
geoprivacy, however, is much more complex than the relatively straighforward
calculation of how long it will take a computer to guess a well-chosen password of
a certain length. The complexity here arises both from the vast range of sources
and potential uses of location information, as well as the range of strategies for
de-anonymization.
Thesis 15 An individual’s level of geoprivacy cannot be reliably assessed be-
cause it is impossible to know what auxialliary information a third
party may have access to.
5 Legal and ethical aspects
In many ways, location privacy is a battle still being fought in court rooms
around the world. The old adage that technology moves faster than policy
or the law, very much holds true here. Law suits either involving or centered
around location-aware technology have been, and will continue to be debated as
technology, privacy and law collide. For example in 2003, a customer of the Pay-
less car rental company was charged over $3000 for traveling out of state (O ce
of the Attorney General, 2004), information that was obtained, unbeknownst to
the customer, from a GPS unit integrated into the rental vehicle. Similarly, a
privacy campaign group in the UK raised legal concerns over devices embedded
in recycling bins around London that logged the MAC addresses of passer-bys’
wi-fi enabled mobile devices (Miller, 2013). It also appears that a legal gray area
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has arisen around location tracking of company-issued property (United States
District Court, E.D. California, 2015), a discussion that will continue as devices,
such as mobile phones, are used in both private and professional situations.
Laws already exist restricting the placement of GPS devices on suspect ve-
hicles by law enforcement agencies (United States Supreme Court, 2015). At
the time of writing of this paper, the United States Surpreme Court has just
decided to hear argument in a petition dealing with cell-tower based location
data (United States Supreme Court, 2017). The petitioner has been convicted
of a series of armed robberies, in part due to his presence in the vicinity of the
crimes. He is now claiming that the information which cell tower his phone was
connected to – acting as a proxy measure for his location in this case – falls
under the Fourth Amendmend. The case will be heard later this year and can
be expected to provide a legal definition of geoprivacy, at least for the United
States.
Legal issues aside, the ethics surrounding location privacy are complex. So-
cial media companies such as Facebook have already begun to blur the lines on
what is ethical and socially responsible (Kramer et al., 2014). It is not only
privately held companies or government groups that should be focused on these
ethical concerns. As researchers we must also be aware of our ethical responsi-
bility to preserving the privacy of individuals (Zimmer, 2010). While research
into new methods of de-anonymization, for example, is important, we must not
lose sight of the fact that research scientists have an ethical responsibility to
bring concerns over geoprivacy to light. In an evocative paper title Geoslavery,
Dobson and Fisher (2003) expressed concern about the impact of GIS technol-
ogy and location-based services, outlining a number of ways that this technology
could be used to violate human rights. While many of the ideas appeared far-
fetched at the time, a number of them are in-use today including real-time
location tracking (Goldstein, 2014) and citizen tracking (Nebeker et al., 2016).
Some groups have gone so far as to patent employee tracking systems (Stoller
and Silverstein, 2005). Furthermore, unforeseen ethical dilemmas have arisen
from location-enabled technology such as location-based cyberbullying (Black
et al., 2016) and celebrity stalking via publicly available transit data (Neustar,
2014).
Thesis 16 The ethical ramifications of advances in location-enabled technology
are often viewed as an afterthought and legal concerns over privacy
aspects lag behind technological advances.
6 Geoprivacy as a tension field
The previous paragraphs show that geoprivacy is a↵ected and influenced by a
number of di↵erent factors. Substantial research has been conducted in many of
these areas, particularly concerning the technological aspects. A more holistic
approach, however, is yet to be developed. In the following, we will attempt
to shed some light on the relationships between the di↵erent aspects that build
this tension field of geoprivacy.
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Thesis 17 Geoprivacy as a research topic is situated in a tension field between
technological, ethical, economical, legal, and educational aspects that
have only been addressed separately so far.
Figure 2 gives an overview of those di↵erent aspects that a↵ect a user’s
geoprivacy. At the center of this field are the user and the tools the user
interacts with, such as mobile apps or devices such as fitness trackers. They
are connected through the utility o↵ered by the tool, which the user is looking
for. In order to leverage this utility, the user needs to provide their location at
a certain precision, where the utility often depends on this precision (see also
Figure 1).
This functional core is a↵ected by additional external factors. The user’s
eduction and level of information have a major impact on judging whether a
tool is safe to use and whether the utility justifies providing some potentially
very personal information. The tools, on the other end, depend on technological
developments that define what can be built. Service providers such as software
companies, banks, or insurance companies leverage these technologies to build
the tools and provide them to the user. They may also share the collected data
with third party services and business, either for storage on cloud platforms, or
as an asset that the third party pays for. In either case, this may happen with or
without the user’s informed consent. Evidently, these processes are most often
driven by economic interests, which, together with ethical considerations, shape
the legal framework the tools need to act within. The legal framework also
a↵ects third party services and businesses and defines under which conditions
and to which degree they can share (e.g., resell) the accumulated data.
Adhering merely to the legal framework does not necessarily ensure that the
corresponding behavior is morally and ethically acceptable (Onsrud, 2008). A
recent example of such legal, yet morally objectable behavior was found in case
of a weather app that geolocated users through router names and IP addresses
and shared that information with other businesses for monetization, even when
the user had turned o↵ location services on their phones for that app (Strafach,
2017). This example demonstrates that there is no exact match between uneth-
ical and illegal conduct: Legal conduct may be unethical, and, in some cases,
ethical conduct may actually be illegal (Onsrud, 1995).
The direct link between the legal framework and the tools therefore reveals a
dilemma of geoprivacy as there is no intermediary control mechanism. In many
cases, users simply have to trust that a tool adheres to the legal and ethical
framework (and to the developer’s description and privacy policy), but unless
it is an open source tool, there is no way to validate that – and even in the case
of open source tools, checking requires an advanced level of education in the
corresponding technologies.
Thesis 18 Users often have no way of checking whether the location-aware ser-
vices and devices they use act within the legal and ethical frameworks
and adhere to the provided description and privacy policy.
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Figure 2: Geoprivacy is influenced by a number of di↵erent aspects, creating a
tension field that makes it di cult to tackle as a whole.
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While it is certainly unrealistic to expect that everybody acquires the pro-
gramming skills required to do so, certification by independent experts has also
been proposed for this purpose, and is already considered best practice in other
fields dealing with PII (Hasselbalch and Tranberg, 2016). In cases where no such
certification is available, better educated users can be expected to be able to
make more informed judgements which tools seem trustworthy, who they share
their location information with, and whether this is a reasonable tradeo↵ for the
utility they are getting. Anecdotal evidence from one of the authors’ 101-level
college classes supports this claim. In a quiz, almost half of the students believed
that the GPS receiver in their phone transmits their location back to the GPS
satellite element. Most of them were also surprised to learn that mobile network
operators can track them in real time through the cell tower their phone is con-
nected to, at a relatively high precision in urban areas with a dense network of
towers. A 2014 survey confirms this, finding that “physical location data is seen
as more sensitive among the college educated” (Pew Research Center, 2014, p.
34). Given the almost ubiquituous use of location-based services, education of
everyday users with little or no background in technology should therefore be a
high priority, ideally as part of general high school education.
Thesis 19 A higher level of user education in the area of position tracking and
location-based services is required to allow them to make more in-
formed decisions about the tools and services they are using.
This lack of technical understanding also seems to hamper initiatives that
push for more restrictive legislation in the collection and use of PII, including
location information. The fact that many users do not seem to understand what
information is being collected about them, and how it is being used, result in a
low priority of these topics on the political agenda. Code becomes law (Lessig,
2006), and whatever is technically possible, will be done.
Thesis 20 A better educated user base can push for more restrictive legislation
and force service providers to be more transparent about their data
collection and use policies.
7 Conclusions
Ubiquituous access to a wide range of services based on our current location is
incredibly useful, timesaving, and, in some cases, even lifesaving. The constant
development of new services shows that the broad potential of location-based
services has yet to be fully tapped. Even more so, the tension between technical
developments, commercial interests, legislation, and an often uninformed user
base that consists of a large (and increasing) part of the population make geo-
privacy a pressing topic that needs to be addressed beyond the many technical
approaches that can be found in the literature. Ethical aspects of recording,
processing, and storing a user’s location information need a broader discussion
that should lead to a clear legislation and more transparency for the users, who
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in turn need to be better informed about how location-based services work and
what can be done with corresponding information. High school seems an appro-
priate level to teach the corresponding topics, which could be covered together
with other media- and technology-related contents. Evidently, such initiatives
are against many service providers’ interests, who want to learn as much as pos-
sible about their users’ whereabouts. Examples include insurance companies,
banks, advertising companies, and customer loyalty programs, among others.
In many cases, the information about what happens with collected location
information and other PII is hidden in lengthy terms of service and privacy
policies that the vast majority of users accept without reading them (Obar and
Oeldorf-Hirsch, 2016) – including the authors of this paper.
While the nearly constant surveillance of one’s location may be largely ab-
stract to most of us, it becomes very concrete if we know who exactly is inter-
ested in where we spend time and who we meet with. This goes for employees
who know that their employer can always locate them – e.g., through a company-
provided smartphone –, but also for children. An increasing number of parents
make use of tracking apps to know where their children are at any given time.7
While there seems to be no research yet about the long-term e↵ects of constant
surveillance by a big brother (or mother), it stands to reason whether it helps
raising independent individuals.
The potential for location information to be used as a tool of oppression
cannot be overstated, particularly in countries where authoritarian regimes are
in control. From participation in demonstrations to meetings with dissidents,
an individual’s location history bears the potential for imprisonment, or worse.
Even in Western democracies, being in the wrong place at the wrong time can
have serious adverse e↵ects. In 2011, the phone numbers of thousands of german
citizens’ were registered based on nearby cell towers after a group of left-wing
activists had blocked a neonazi march in Dresden, putting them in the focus
of an investigation without any wrongdoing (Biermann, 2017). Such news will
arguably lead to preemptive obedience for citizens who fear potential adverse
consequences.
Thesis 21 Constant surveillance of citizens’ locations can be used as a tool for
oppression and to limit freedom of speech, even in democracies.
While these are by no means new observations, there is still no broad discus-
sion, let alone consensus in society as to what uses of location information are
acceptable, and where the red line is that should not be crossed. Areas such as
health or finance are already seeing stricter regulation concerning the use of PII,
and, even more important, raised everyday users’ awareness. Topics that used
to be of interest only to security specialists, such as two-factor authentication
or end-to-end encryption, are now being discussed in mainstream media. We
hope that this article contributes to this debate, as well as to the manifestation
7
For example, at the time writing of this paper, the app Find My Kids – GPS Tracker
for Android is listed with 1–5 million installs, and a 4 out of 5 rating: https://play.google.
com/store/apps/details?id=com.fsp.android.g.
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of the right to (location) privacy as an achievement of modern civilization, and
not just a mere “blip in human history” (Weigend, 2017, p. 47).
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